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Abstract 
As members of an interactive society, humans are continuously presented with 
opinions, suggestions, and innovative ideas. They are subject to constant pressure, different 
motivations, and endless influence by others. How can people negotiate their way around 
this complex social world? The present study aims to clarify and provide support for 
previous research on the impact of group membership, deviant behavior and threat to social 
identity. It specifically focuses on the effect that a morally deviant ingroup member and an 
insecure intergroup context have on the judgments from other ingroup individuals.  
The theories of social identity (e.g. Tajfel & Turner, 1986), self-categorization (e.g. 
Turner, 1982), and the model of subjective group dynamics (e.g. Marques, Páez & Abrams, 
1998), as well as the two basic dimensions of social judgments, morality and competence 
(e.g. Rosenberg, Nelson & Vivekananthan, 1968), are central to the theoretical framework 
of this investigation.  
Through manipulation of Group Membership (Ingroup / Outgroup), Type of 
Deviance (Immoral / Incompetent) and Intergroup Comparison (Secure / Insecure) in a 
factorial design, we established the roles of these variables. Our hypotheses that there 
would be an effect of primacy of morality over competence in the Immoral condition and a 
pattern consistent with a halo effect in the judgments of an Immoral Ingroup Member in an 
Insecure Intergroup Context were generally supported by the results. 
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Resumo 
Como membros de uma sociedade interativa, os seres humanos são continuamente 
apresentados com opiniões, sugestões e ideias inovadoras. Eles estão sujeitos a uma 
pressão constante, motivações diferentes, e a influência interminável por outros. Como é 
que as pessoas podem negociar o seu caminho em torno deste complexo mundo social? O 
presente estudo visa esclarecer e fornecer apoio para as pesquisas anteriores sobre o 
impacto da pertença a um grupo, do comportamento desviante e da ameaça à identidade 
social. Foca-se especificamente no efeito que um membro endogrupal moralmente 
desviante, num contexto intergrupal inseguro, tem nos julgamos que recebe de outros 
indivíduos do grupo. 
As teorias da identidade social (e.g. Tajfel & Turner, 1986), a auto-categorização 
(e.g. Turner, 1982), e o modelo da dinâmica de grupos subjetiva (e.g. Marques, Paez & 
Abrams, 1998), bem como as duas dimensões básicas dos julgamentos sociais, moralidade 
e competência (e.g. Rosenberg, Nelson & Vivekananthan, 1968), são fundamentais para o 
enquadramento teórico desta investigação.  
Através da manipulação da Pertença Grupal (Endogrupo / Exogrupo), Tipo de 
Desvio (Imoral / Incompetente) e Comparação Entre os Grupos (Segura / Insegura), num 
plano fatorial, estabelecemos os papéis destas variáveis. As nossas hipóteses de que se 
verificaria um efeito de primazia da moralidade sobre a competência na condição Imoral e 
um padrão consistente com um efeito de halo nos julgamentos de um membro Imoral do 
Endogrupo num Contexto Intergrupal Inseguro foram globalmente suportadas pelos 
resultados. 
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Resumen 
Como miembros de una sociedad interactiva, los humanos se ven confrontados 
constantemente con opiniones, sugestiones e ideas innovadoras. Sujetos a presiones 
constantes, diferentes motivaciones y la perpetua  influencia de los otros. ¿Cómo pueden 
las personas negociar su camino al redor de este complexo mundo social? El presente 
estudio quiere esclarecer y fornecer apoyo a las pesquisas anteriores acerca del impacto de 
la pretensa a un grupo, del comportamiento desviante y de la amenaza a la identidad social. 
Se foca en especial en el efecto que un miembro del endogrupo moralmente desviante, en 
un contexto intergrupal inseguro, tiene en los juzgamientos de los otros miembros del 
grupo. 
Las teorías de la identidad social (e.g. Tajfel & Turner, 1986), la auto-
categorización (e.g.  Turner, 1982), y el modelo de la dinámica de grupos subjetiva (e.g. 
Marques, Paez & Abrams, 1998), así como las dos dimensiones básicas de los 
juzgamientos sociales, moralidad y competencia (e.g. Rosenberg, Nelson & 
Vivekananthan, 1968), son fundamentales para el encuadramiento teórico de esta 
investigación. 
A través de la manipulación de la Pretensa Grupal (Endogrupo / Exogrupo), Tipo 
de Desvío (Inmoral / Incompetente) y Comparación Entre los Grupos (Segura / Insegura), 
en un plan factorial, establecemos los papeles de estas variables. Nuestras hipótesis de que 
se verificaría un efecto de primacía de la moralidad sobre la competencia en la condición 
Inmoral y un padrón consistente con un efecto de halo en los juzgamientos de un miembro 
Inmoral del Endogrupo en un Contexto Intergrupal Inseguro fueron globalmente 
suportadas por los resultados.   
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Introduction 
The complexity of human interaction is reflected in the impact that the existence of 
others has on the way humans feel, believe, and act. From genocide in Nazi Germany, to 
political paradigms and voting decisions, to simple expressed opinions in conversations 
with a long-time friend, the expansive influence of social relationships is extraordinary. 
This overwhelming influence on different aspects of human life has been contemplated by 
researchers for many years. The present study aims to develop the concept by focusing on 
the role of social identity theory, self-categorization theory, and the model of subjective 
group dynamics, while specifically analyzing the unique association between the two 
fundamental dimensions of social perception, which are morality and competence. We 
intend to prove that within the realm of social judgment, group membership, type of 
deviance, and presence or absence of threat within intergroup comparison can play a 
momentous role. 
Specifically, this study was developed in order to provide support to help answer 
questions of social influence, such as: When considering socially or intellectually deviant 
individuals, that is, immoral or incompetent, are those who are socially deviant more 
harshly judged, regardless of ingroup or outgroup status? Does immoral behavior provoke 
a stronger negative emotional reaction than incompetence? What role does threat to 
intergroup comparison play in the judgment of a deviant group member? How harshly are 
immorally deviant ingroup members evaluated when there is a treat to positive ingroup 
representation? The concepts of group membership, deviant behavior and threat to social 
identity are central in the present research. 
The paper begins with a summary of the central concepts of social identity theory 
(e.g. Tajfel & Turner, 1986), self-categorization theory (e.g. Turner, 1982), and the model 
of subjective group dynamics (e.g. Marques, Páez & Abrams, 1998) in order to establish 
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the background knowledge on basic social phenomenon. Next, the two basic dimensions of 
social judgments, morality and competence (e.g. Rosenberg, Nelson & Vivekananthan, 
1968), are described, including explanations of the relationship between the two 
dimensions  (e.g. Judd et al., 2005) and the primacy of morality (e.g. Leach, Ellemers, & 
Barreto, 2007; Wojciszke & Dowhyluk, 2003).  
Following the theoretical framework, we present the 3-level factorial design of this 
study and the research methodology.  The results are then presented; including all 
statistical analyses run using the software SPSS. Finally, we present a discussion of results 
and our conclusions regarding the study and possible further research. 
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Social Identity Theory 
Social identity theory is centered on the idea of the individual within the group. 
Social identity is the individual’s definition of self, based on membership to a group and 
the emotional and value significance given to that group membership (Tajfel, 1972). While 
humans are individual beings with personal characteristics (ie: “I like chocolate”, “I get 
along with my brother”), as members of society, they also define themselves through group 
membership (“I am a woman”, “I am a supporter of team X”). The purpose of social 
identity theory is to explain the how individuals establish and understand their role in 
society. It describes the situations in which individuals view themselves as a singular 
person or as a member of a group, and elaborates on the effect of this identity definition on 
group behavior and individual perceptions (Abrams & Hogg, 1990).  
Social identity theory was established through the study of the conditions that lead 
to favoring the ingroup (the group to which the individual is a member) and opposing or 
disapproving the outgroup (the group to which the individual is not a member), known as 
minimal group studies (Tajfel, 1972; Turner, 1975, 1978). Since these initial studies, the 
theory has developed and been extended to many different aspects of group behavior, 
including stereotyping, intergroup conflict, and leadership (Levine and Hogg, 2010). 
 
Cognitive Processes 
One of the basic features of social identity theory is that there are three 
psychological processes involved in the way people socially define or classify themselves: 
social categorization, social comparison, and social identification (Tajfel, 1979). Social 
categorization is based on the tendency that people view themselves or others only as 
members of groups, rather than as individuals. When social categorization is the central 
	  
	  
13	  
means of perceiving a person, he may lose some of his unique characteristics because he is 
seen solely as a member of a certain group.  
Social comparison refers to the process by which a group is perceived as having a 
particular value, especially in relation to the value of other groups. Through social 
comparison, some groups and their members are considered as more socially valuable by 
their characteristics. For example, social comparison may lead to the consideration that 
professors are more valuable than construction workers. However, in comparison with a 
different social group, such as doctors, professors may be considered to be of lower social 
value.  
Social identification considers the idea that people tend to view social situations 
with regards to how they view themselves and their social relation to others, rather than as 
subjective outsiders. In other words, an individual’s outlook on the world, his place and the 
place of others is based on the position that he occupies in society. A construction worker’s 
awareness of his social standing in relation to professors, according to social comparison, 
will affect the way he views himself and how he interacts with professors and other 
construction workers. 
An individual’s social identity is formed based on these three processes, as they 
allow the person to understand his level of belonging within social groups combined with 
emotional meaning and value placed on that membership. Although personal identity is 
based on an individual’s awareness of his personal attributes and unique qualities, social 
identity reflects whom an individual is, based on his group membership (Levine and Hogg, 
2010). 
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Behavior Motivation and Status Improvement 
One central feature of social identity theory is the concept of behavior motivation. 
The idea is that behavior can be either motivated by the individual, which is considered 
interpersonal behavior, or by the group membership of the individual, considered 
intergroup behavior. Group membership motivated behavior is often a response to people’s 
desire for a positive portrayal of their group. This need for their group to be positively 
regarded by other groups and individuals can lead to a focus on the positive attributes 
(traits, attitudes and behaviors) of their group or to an emphasis on the less desirable 
characteristics of an outgroup (Tajfel, 1979; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). 
When an individual believes that his group may be negatively regarded, the 
solution to this dilemma depends on his social belief system, which ranges from an 
individual mobility belief system to a social change belief system. The individual mobility 
belief system, or notion that an individual can move freely between social groups, allows 
for a person to change their social status by simply moving to another social group. On the 
other hand, the social change belief system is the conviction that the movement of the 
group’s social standing is the only way to change its status (Ellemers, Spears & Doosje, 
1999). 
 
Self-Categorization Theory 
Turner’s role in the study of social identity theory led him to the development of 
self-categorization theory (Turner, 1982). The theory’s development first came about as an 
explanation of the distinction between social identity and personal identity. Self-
categorization is closely related to social identity theory, but the details of the theories 
differ in that self-categorization places more emphasis on cognition and self-definition 
based on the group, while social identity theory focuses on motivation and intergroup 
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dimensions. Specifically, self-categorization theory explains the cognitive process of 
categorization within groups, which leads to identification with that specific group, and the 
different behaviors that result from group membership (Ellemers, Spears & Doosje, 1999). 
 
Prototypes and Categorization 
 One of the central aspects of self-categorization theory is the representation that 
individuals have about specific features of a group, which can be considered the prototype 
of that group. Prototypes include the general characteristics used to describe the similarities 
within a group and the differences between groups. Prototypes allow for entitativity 
(Campbell, 1958), or the consideration that a group is a pure and distinct entity, as they 
push for clear and specific representations of the group. The consideration of prototypes to 
define groups leads to the categorization of individuals, which often results in the binary 
categorization of our selves within the ingroup and the other within the outgroup. 
Prototypes are dependent on context, since they can change when the reference of 
comparison to an outgroup changes (Turner, 1987).  
Due to the use of prototypes to categorize others, individuals tend to become 
depersonalized, and regarded as a generic member of the group. This depersonalization of 
outgroup members leads to the formation of group stereotypes, as group members lose 
their personal traits and are considered to hold only the prototypical characteristics of the 
group. Categorization can also occur with the ingroup or with the self. Categorizing the 
self can lead to self-stereotyping, or the consideration that we are defined by the traits of 
the ingroup. The categorization of ingroup members, combined with the idea of 
prototypical group behavior, leads to the definition of group norms. Acceptable group 
behavior is therefore reflective of established norms, and can be considered normative 
behavior (Turner, 1982, 1987). 
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Affect Regarding the Ingroup and Ethnocentrism 
 The cognitive impacts of self-categorization can influence people’s affect. The 
feelings they have for ingroup members are based more on their fit into the group 
prototype than their individual characteristics. According to this concept, the more a 
member fits the prototype, the more liked he will be by group members. Another important 
aspect of this idea is that ingroup members should, therefore, be more liked than outgroup 
members because the ingroup prototype is considered more attractive and outgroup 
members are unprototypical (Turner, 1987; Ellemers, Spears & Doosje, 1999).   
The idea that people view the ingroup prototype as better than outgroup prototypes 
is related to ethnocentrism, or the consideration that the ingroup is wholly superior to any 
outgroup (Turner, 1987). Since people want their ethnocentric beliefs to be true, there is a 
constant pressure on group status and need for self-enhancement of the group to moderate 
collective self-esteem. Theories have emerged that incorporate self-categorization theory 
with social identity theory to explain how people behave as a result of this motivation for 
self and group enhancement. Uncertainty-identity theory (Hogg, 2007) explains that people 
do not like uncertainty about their place in the social world and about their expected 
actions (and those of others), so they try to reduce these feelings of uncertainty. The ability 
for individuals to define themselves and know how they and others are supposed to act, 
based on social identity, allows for a reduction in uncertainty. Another theory that 
incorporates both social identity theory and self-categorization theory as aspects to explain 
behavioral motivation is the optimal distinctiveness theory (Brewer, 1991). The theory 
states that people are motivated to be both unique individuals and generic members of 
groups, and to solve this dilemma they must find an optimal amount of distinctiveness. 
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Normative and Deviant Behavior 
Self-categorization theory helps to shed light on the cognitive processes related to 
depersonalization, group prototypes, stereotypes and normative behavior. Due to the 
consequence of ethnocentrism, individuals want all members of their group to be the best 
group representative possible. As such, members should epitomize the prototype, and 
therefore display normative behavior. Consequently, individuals who do not fit the mold 
and have deviant behavior will not be treated the same or viewed equally as those who are 
nearly perfect prototypes. This type of response is exactly what the model of subjective 
group dynamics explains, below. Although deviant behavior may be important because it 
helps to define the rules and boundaries of certain behaviors, those who are deviant will 
experience the social ingroup and outgroup differently than those who are normative 
members (Levine and Hogg, 2010). 
 
Subjective Group Dynamics 
The model of subjective group dynamics is related to both social identity theory 
and self-categorization theory. Social identity theory supports the idea that people have a 
desire for their ingroup to be considered socially favorable, and therefore they will 
perceive anyone who brings an unfavorable quality to their ingroup as negative. Self-
categorization theory is associated, in that individuals make judgments about favorable 
qualities based on the prototype of the ingroup. Accordingly, non-prototypical members 
are considered as unfavorable, and consequently, are a negative aspect of the ingroup. 
These non-prototypical individuals are considered to be deviant group members.  
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Intergroup and Intragroup Differentiation 
The model of subjective group dynamics essentially states that individuals may 
differentiate among ingroup members if they are provoked to differentiate between groups 
(their ingroup and an outgroup). Further, individuals who are more concerned with 
intergroup differentiation will be more likely to differentiate among group members when 
a deviant is present (Marques et al., 2001; Marques, Páez & Abrams, 1998). Even though 
the model relates social identity theory and self-categorization theory, it actually describes 
circumstances in which people do not behave as would be expected. The former theories 
suggest that individuals always perceive the ingroup, and members of the ingroup, in a 
more positive light than outgroup members, but that is evidently not the case.  
 
The Black Sheep Effect 
The feature of subjective group dynamics known as the black sheep effect can 
elaborate on this situation. The black sheep effect (Marques et al., 1988) demonstrates an 
intriguing response of individuals when a fellow ingroup member is considered deviant, as 
they will evaluate the deviant more negatively than members of an outgroup who exhibit 
the same behavior. In other words, they punish or dislike a member of their own ingroup 
more than an outgroup member, when the two have to same traits or behaviors. This 
reaction can be explained by the model of subjective group dynamics, which emphasizes 
that when prescriptive ingroup norms are violated, other ingroup members will have a 
harsh and negative judgment of the behavior. Additionally, the more salient the intergroup 
differences, and the more important the norm is considered in the group, the more group 
members will focus on the deviant behavior and view it as a violation (Marques et al., 
2001; Marques, Páez & Abrams, 1998). There are different follow-up reactions for dealing 
with deviants within the group, which may include pressure to conform to the group norms 
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or acceptance of the individuals because of other positive qualities he adds to the group 
(Levine & Hogg, 2010). 
 
The Fundamental Dimensions of Social Perception 
Morality and Competence 
In their research on personality impressions, Rosenberg, Nelson and Vivekananthan 
(1968) encountered an intriguing pattern in the way personality traits are grouped along 
two dimensions of social perception. They found that in participants’ descriptions of 
people they knew, the organization of 64 personality traits fell along a two-dimensional 
structure with poles of positivity and negativity. They coined the dimensions as social 
good-bad and intellectual good-bad. Today, these two dimensions go by many names, 
including other-profitability and self-profitability (Peeters, 1992), agency and communion 
(Abele, 2003), warmth and competence (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007; Fiske, Cuddy, 
Glick, & Xu, 2002), and morality and competence (Wojciszke, 1994). Although the terms 
differ, it is generally agreed upon that these dimensions are the fundamental components 
underlying judgments of the self, others, and groups (Abele & Wojciszke, 2007; Fiske, 
Cuddy, & Glick, 2007; Judd et al., 2005). In the case of the current study, the terms 
morality and competence will be utilized.  
Since the initial proposal of the existence of two fundamental components of social 
judgment, there has been substantial effort by researchers to determine the details of 
morality and competence, the characteristics of their unique relationship, and their specific 
impact within the realm of social perception. Wojciszke (1994, 2005b) defined the two 
dimensions through the goals of behaviors. For example, the moral dimension is associated 
with the intention of the goal, and whether it is morally right or wrong, and the competence 
dimension refers to the ability of the individual to reach that goal. Within this goal-oriented 
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interpretation, there are four classifications of action, depending on the negativity or 
positivity of the actor’s morality and competence pertaining to goal attainment. The four 
types of action are virtuous success, virtuous failure, sinful success, and sinful failure 
(Wojciszke, 1994). 
As an extension to the idea of goal orientation, research by Wojciszke, Abele and 
Baryla (2009) explained the evaluations that others have of individuals who perform 
actions within the four classifications. Those who are virtuously successful are liked and 
respected, those who virtuously fail are liked and disrespected, those who are sinfully 
successful are disliked and respected, and those who sinfully fail are disliked and 
disrespected. This work clearly demonstrated the range of judgments that occur in response 
to actions with differing levels of morality and competence. 
 
Relationship Between Morality and Competence: Halo Effect 
The vast quantity of literature on morality and competence is a clear indicator of 
their significance in social perception. However, there is a notable divide in the opinions of 
the way in which these two conceptual opposites relate to one another. The two 
predominant views explain the relationship as having either a halo effect or a compensation 
effect. The halo effect in social judgment is an overestimation of the extent to which 
positive attributes along different dimensions go together (Thorndike, 1920). Support for a 
halo, or valence, effect comes from investigators who found evidence of a relationship 
between dimensions that leads to an influence on perceptions in the same direction. Since 
nearly all traits have a positive and a negative pole, shared valences on that spectrum will 
influence respective judgments. In other words, an effect of valence suggests that when an 
individual is considered positive in one aspect, that positivity will impact other aspects, 
which will then be regarded as more positive.  
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In the original research that established the existence of the fundamental 
dimensions of social perception, Rosenberg, Nelson and Vivekananthan (1968) 
encountered a significant positive correlation between morality and competence, in that 
individuals who are perceived as warm are also seen as competent. This research 
established that in the judgments of morality and competence of individuals, dimensions of 
similar valence correspond.  
The impact of trait valence between dimensions has been shown in studies on 
global impression formation and information integration (Anderson, 1965; Srull & Wyer, 
1989). In his classic work on impression formation, Asch (1946) not only exhibited the 
effect of valence of traits in general judgments, but he showed that the valence of morality 
can play a special role. When describing targets with a series of positive competence traits 
and one morality trait (intelligent, skillful, industrious, warm/cold, determined, practical, 
cautious) the positive or negative valence of the single morality trait significantly impacted 
the global impression that participants had of the target. In a similar fashion, Zanna and 
Hamilton (1972) demonstrated that the valence of the competence dimension, when listed 
as the sole competence aspect among positive morality traits, has a comparable effect on 
central impression.  
 
Relationship Between Morality and Competence: Compensation Effect 
Advocates of the compensation effect argue that when one of the fundamental 
aspects of social judgment is viewed positively, the other will be viewed negatively, so as 
to compensate each other. For example, Judd et al. (2005) asked participants to rate 
fictional target individuals or groups after they were provided with a description of 
behaviors that were either competent or incompetent, but neutral in morality. They found 
that competent targets were considered colder than incompetent targets, and in the same 
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fashion in a later study, that moral targets were rated as more incompetent, demonstrating 
the opposing, or compensating, relationship between the dimensions. 
 Additional confirmation of the compensation effect has been found in studies on 
groups that have mixed-stereotypes, such as the research by Yzerbyt, Provost, and 
Corneille (2005), which looked at the perceptions that Belgian and French people have of 
themselves and each other. Both groups rated the Belgians as less competent than warm 
and the French as more competent than warm, which shows a clear reverse in the 
judgments on the two dimensions. A study by Cuddy, Norton, and Fiske (2005) also 
demonstrated support of the compensation effect in a their research on the stereotype of the 
elderly, in which elderly people are viewed as warm but incompetent. Cuddy, Fiske, and 
Glick (2004) showed similar evidence in a study on the stereotype of female professionals, 
in which working mothers were considered warmer but less competent than other 
professional women who were childless.  
 Although there may be significant evidence in support of the compensation effect, it 
should be noted that a comparison context is necessary for this effect to be present. In fact, 
in the previously mentioned work by Judd and colleagues (2005) in which a compensation 
effect was found, a halo effect was actually demonstrated when there was a lack of 
comparison context. In three of the four experiments by Judd et al., a comparison between 
individuals or groups was demanded, which in turn elicited a compensation effect in 
perception. However, in the fourth experiment (Judd et al., 2005, Experiment 4), when 
participants were not provided with a comparison context and judged only one group, a 
halo effect emerged with the positive valence of morality and competence.  
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The Primacy of Morality 
 The extensive research on the dimensions of morality and competence within social 
perception has shed light on their unique relationship. However, within this phenomenon 
of the fundamental dimensions, morality has been shown to play a special role. At the most 
basic level, morality is more salient. When completing lexical decision tasks, participants 
are faster to recognize morality traits than competence traits (Ybarra, Chan & Park, 2001). 
Additionally, it has been shown that people make more reliable morality judgments than 
competence judgments, even with very short amounts of exposure (Willis & Todorov, 
2006). 
This dominance of the morality dimension is likely due to the importance that is 
given to morality within the sphere of human interaction. In a cross-cultural study, Ybarra 
and colleagues (2008) found that a large percentage of universal behavior and thought is 
related with managing the social aspects of group existence and interaction, more so than 
competence-related aspects. In addition, they discovered that there was more similarity 
across cultures in the aspects of behavior and judgments pertaining to morality than to 
competence.  
This global agreement on the significance of morality can explain why morality is 
an especially influential dimension in social judgment when it is coupled with the norms 
established by society. That is, the moral dimension of social perception is a reflection of 
the extent to which an individual’s goals conform with or defy social norms, whereas the 
competence dimension corresponds to an individual’s success in attaining said goals 
(Wojciszke, 2005a). Therefore, the morality dimension has more impact on social factors 
and the competence dimension is more an indication of individual ability. Work by 
Wojciszke (1994) supported this dynamic and demonstrated that observers regard the 
behaviors of others in terms of morality rather than competence, while actors interpret their 
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own behaviors more in terms of competence than morality. Further investigating on 
responses to the acts of others posits that people have a stronger emotional reaction to the 
morality in behaviors of others than to their competence (Wojciszke & Dowhyluk, 2003). 
Additionally, the valence of morality prompts divergent emotional reactions, as the 
immoral behavior of others is perceived as inherently negative, whereas moral behavior is 
more ambiguous. When an immoral act is committed, it leads to a negative emotional 
reaction, regardless of whether or not the observer likes the actor. However, when a moral 
act is carried out, the subsequent emotional reaction is positive only when the performer of 
the act is liked, and is ambiguous when the performer is not liked (Wojciszke & Szymków, 
2003). 
When it comes to making evaluations, morality has clear primacy. Leach, Ellemers, 
and Barreto (2007) found that morality corresponds more to positive evaluations of the 
ingroup, as well as personal identification with and pride in the ingroup. Further, in 
extensive studies on ethnocentrism across cultures, morality was regarded as the most 
important characteristic to ingroup favoritism (Brewer & Campbell, 1976; Levine & 
Campbell, 1972). Substantial research (De Bruin, & Van Lange, 1999; Martijn, et al., 
1992; Vonk, 1996) has demonstrated that the formation of global evaluations is more 
contingent on impressions of morality than information relative to competence. Wojciszke, 
Bazinska, and Jaworski (1998) also found that morality traits are central in forming global 
impressions of others, including when the others are fictitious, while competence traits 
were only instrumental as a weak modifier. The same study also supported previous 
evidence (Peeters, 1992) that the moral sense of an act can significantly alter the evaluation 
of competence, but not the other way around, which corroborates the halo effect and gives 
greater power to morality.  
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Overview 
The hypotheses for this study are concerned with effects related to moral deviance, 
ingroup membership and a threat to social identity. Specifically, we hypothesized that in 
the dimension consistent with the target’s behavior, results would demonstrate an effect of 
primacy of morality. That is, regardless of the target’s membership, participants in the 
Immoral condition should attribute less positive (morality characteristics) and more 
negative characteristics (immorality characteristics) to the target, than in the attribution of 
competence/incompetence characteristics by participants in the Incompetent condition. In 
other words, the immoral target is judged more harshly.  Additionally, we predicted that 
this effect would be stronger in the Ingroup condition.  
Our second central hypothesis was that we would encounter a pattern consistent 
with a halo effect when it comes to evaluating the target on the alternate dimension: 
judging an Immoral on his competence or incompetence, or an Incompetent in his morality 
or immorality. We predicted that participants would attribute less competence and more 
incompetence to the Immoral Ingroup Member in the Insecure Intergroup Comparison, 
than targets in any other condition. We anticipated that we would find these effects in the 
measures of Attribution of Competence and Morality Characteristics to the Target as well 
as General Evaluation of the Target’s Morality, Competence and Overall Impression. 
Further, a secondary hypothesis in the dependent measure of Emotional Reaction to 
Type of Deviance and Intergroup Comparison was that the strongest negative emotional 
reaction would be found in the condition in which participants are presented with an 
Immoral target and within an Insecure Intergroup Comparison setting.  
Regarding the experimental factor Membership, the Outgroup chosen was Spanish. 
The dependent measures of Portuguese Identity and Differentiation from Spanish were 
utilized in order to confirm participants’ affiliation with the utilized Ingroup (Portuguese) 
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and separation from the Outgroup (Spanish). The decision to use Spanish as the Outgroup 
variable was reached after debate about a nationality that was similar to Portuguese, but 
that was generally not desired as an alternative. Although the Outgroup that was utilized in 
the experiment was Spanish, questions about Italian identity were inserted following the 
questions to determine Differentiation from Spanish in order to try to avoid suspicion about 
the true purpose of the study.  
With respect to the factor Deviance, it should be noted that we only presented 
circumstances in which the target displayed deviant behavior. Normative behavior was not 
utilized because the objective of this study focused on the difference between the negative 
valence of the two dimensions of social perception, or the judgments of immorality versus 
incompetence. 
Concerning the factor Intergroup Comparison, we devised a Secure and an 
Insecure condition. A Secure Intergroup Comparison was meant to make the participants 
feel that the ingroup was behaving as would be expected in their judgments of a deviant (a 
stronger negative evaluation), while an Insecure Comparison was meant to elicit feelings 
of threat to the status of the ingroup by making it seem unclear whether or not the ingroup 
was making judgments that would be expected. 
 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 92 (12 male, 80 female) Portuguese students from the University 
of Porto who were between the ages of 18 and 37 (M = 19.93, SD = 3.15). The participants 
were enrolled in various statistics courses at the Faculty of Psychology and Education 
Science. They were solicited for participation during their class time and were not 
compensated for their participation in the experiment.  
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Materials and Procedure 
 Participants were randomly assigned to one of eight conditions, based on the 
following factorial design: 2 (Group Membership: Ingroup vs. Outgroup) x 2 (Type of 
Deviance: Immoral vs. Incompetent) x 2 (Intergroup Comparison: Secure vs. Insecure). 
The number of participants per condition varied from 11 to 12, χ2 (1, N = 92) < 1. 
Materials for this study included one questionnaire, in booklet format, with a cover page 
and six interior pages (three full-sized pages, folded in half) of manipulation and surveys. 
Participants were presented with the questionnaire that initially explained that the 
experiment in which they were about to participate was part of a larger international study 
that was taking place in several universities. This explanation was given in order to avoid 
suspicion about the forthcoming questions pertaining to ingroup and outgroup opinions. 
 Once participants received some general instruction, and prior to any manipulation, 
they were asked to answer a series of questions tapping the value they ascribe to Personal 
and Social Levels of Self-Categorization (Personal and Social Identity Scale – 16 items) 
and another set of questions that measured their Portuguese Identity and feelings of 
Differentiation from Spanish.  
After completing the Personal and Social Level of Self-Categorization survey and 
the Portuguese Identity/Differentiation from Spanish survey, participants were presented 
with the experimental manipulation on an alternate page of the questionnaire, so as to not 
be seen prior to that point. The manipulation included a fictitious explanation that clarified 
that within the international investigation, the teams from different countries analyzed the 
reactions that people have towards different behaviors and the consequences of those 
reactions. It then presented one of the situations that had supposedly been discussed among 
previous participants, which described that a group of former classmates met after many 
years and spoke about their respective lives. It said that in general, the people were happy 
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and successful. Then, the manipulation of the factor Type of Deviance was introduced. The 
description said that after more conversation, they discovered that one of the people in the 
group had either: embezzled money from the company at which he was a manager 
(Immoral condition); or got his company into a difficult financial situation after not 
completing a job on time (Incompetent condition).  
 
Manipulation of Type of Deviance:  
“Num jantar de antigos colegas de escola que não se encontravam há vários anos, as 
pessoas foram conversando umas com as outras sobre as suas vidas privadas. Puderam 
constatar que, na generalidade, são pessoas felizes e realizadas. No entanto, através de 
algumas conversas, acabam por descobrir que uma dessas pessoas colocou numa 
situação difícil uma das empresas em que trabalhou como gestor, por ter desviado 
ilicitamente quantias de dinheiro importantes [...por não fazer cumprir os prazos de 
produção contratados].” 
 
Below the story was a graph that was part of the next experimental manipulation of 
Intergroup Comparison. The graph appeared identical in both conditions, with two slightly 
overlapping bell-shaped curves of the evaluations of previous Portuguese and Spanish 
participants. However, there was a small header above the graph that changed. In the 
Secure condition, the text said that Portuguese people had a statistically more negative 
evaluation of the target they just read about, while in the Insecure condition, it said that it 
was unclear which of the two groups of participants had a more negative evaluation of the 
target. Additionally, a small “ns (non-sig.)” or “p < .001 (sig.)” was placed over the graph, 
depending on the condition (cf. Appendix 1). In the Insecure condition, the manipulation 
was meant to provoke feelings of threat to the social identity of Portuguese people, as they 
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should want the other members of their group to have a more harsh evaluation of someone 
who is performing a deviant behavior.  
Following the story and graph, there was a small survey of six measures of Emotional 
Reaction to Type of Deviance and Intergroup Comparison. It included factors of surprise, 
disappointment, satisfaction, mood, worry, and anxiety, all of which were to be rated on a 
9-point scale. 
On the next page, so as to not yet be seen, the questionnaire explained that the story the 
participant just read actually came from a recent newspaper article. In order to generate the 
third, and final, experimental manipulation of Membership, the article was said to have 
come from either the Portuguese newspaper Jornal de Notícias or the Spanish newspaper 
El País. This way, participants would judge the deviant target as either being a member of 
their ingroup or from an outgroup. 
After this clarification, participants evaluated the target person across a series of 
measures: participants were asked to ascribe morality and competence characteristics to the 
target. Finally, participants provided their sex and age, and were thanked for their 
participation. 
 
Dependent Measures 
Value ascribed to personal and social levels of self-categorization. Participants 
were ask the extent to which they agreed with a series of sentences that focused either on 
the value of social identity or personal identity, adapted from the Personal and Social 
Identity Scale (e.g. Gomes and Serôdio, in preparation). The scale is composed of 16 items, 
8 related to social identity and 8 to personal identity, all of which were to be rated on a 9-
point Likert scale ranging from “completely disagree” to “completely agree”. 
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Table 1. Principal Components Analysis on the Items of Value Ascribed to Personal and 
Social Levels of Self-Categorization (with Varimax rotation) 1 
 Component  
 
Social 
Identity 
Personal 
Identity Com. 
Os grupos sociais de que faço parte têm reflexo 
naquilo que eu sou. .84  .71 
Encontramos nos grupos de que fazemos parte 
aquilo que nos define como pessoas. .83  .70 
Definimo-nos como pessoas pelos grupos a que 
pertencemos. .75  .57 
Definimo-nos como pessoas pelos padrões dos 
grupos a que pertencemos. .68  .49 
Habitualmente, aquilo que acontece com um grupo a 
que pertenço tem influência na minha vida. .62  .41 
Os grupos sociais a que eu pertenço contribuem 
para definir a pessoa que eu sou. .61  .37 
O que partilhamos com as pessoas dos grupos a que 
pertencemos é a essência daquilo que somos. .60  .37 
A “essência” de cada pessoa está dentro de si.  .85 .73 
Definimo-nos como pessoas ao sermos “nós 
próprios”.  .80 .65 
Aquilo que nos define como pessoas deve ser 
encontrado dentro de nós.  .68 .51 
Para ter uma opinião pessoal sobre as coisas que me 
importam, mais vale pensar por mim mesmo(a).  .64 .42 
Ao definirmo-nos como pessoas devemos 
procurar ser “únicos”.  .60 .36 
Para definir quem somos temos de ser 
independentes dos outros.  .52 .29 
Total Variance Explained (%) = 50.48 27.83 22.65  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 KMO = .77; Bartlett’s test of Sphericity, χ2 (78, N = 92) = 458.25, p < .001; discarded items: “As pessoas 
que dependem apenas de si próprias progridem mais facilmente na vida”; “Tenho fortes laços com os 
grupos sociais a que pertenço.”; “Depender apenas de mim é importante para ter mais controlo sobre o que 
me acontece.”. 
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Despite the somewhat limited number of participants, we ran a Principal 
Components Analysis (PCA) on the 16 items.2 Using a Varimax rotation, and a forced 
solution of 2 components, the solutions accounted for 50.48% of the total variance. Three 
items were eliminated from the initial solution due to low communalities. The final 
solution with the two components is reported in Table 1. One of the components loaded all 
of the remaining 7 items that measure the value ascribed to Social Identity, and the other 
loaded the 6 items regarding the value of Personal Identity. 
 We computed one measure corresponding to the mean of 7 items measuring the 
value attributed to Social Identity, Crobach’s α = .84, and another one for the value 
attributed to Personal Identity, on the remaining 6 items, α = .78.3 
Portuguese identity. Participants had to indicate their agreement with 6 sentences 
that measured the extent to which they identify with being Portuguese: (1) Para mim é 
muito importante ser português. (2) Tenho orgulho em dizer que sou português. (3) Tenho 
uma ligação forte com o meu país. (4) Prefiro ser português do que ser de outra 
nacionalidade qualquer. (5) É importante para mim sentir-me português. (6) Tenho orgulho 
das tradições e da história de Portugal. All items were rated on a 9-point Likert scale 
ranging from “completely disagree” to “completely agree”. We created a measure of 
Portuguese Identity on the basis of the mean of these 6 items, α = .86.4 
Differentiation from Spanish. Participants also responded to 3 questions 
measuring the extent to which they differentiate Portuguese people from Spanish people: 
(1) Os portugueses e espanhóis são semelhantes em muitos aspetos. (2) Em geral, os 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Participants/variable ratio = 5.75.  
3 Mean rs, respectively, .42 and .37.	  
4 Mean r = .51. 
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espanhóis têm mais razões para ter orgulho nas suas tradições e história. (3) Preferia ser 
espanhol do que português. (-4 = “completely disagree”, +4 = “completely agree”).5  
Emotional reaction to type of deviance and intergroup comparison. 
Immediately after the manipulation of Type of Deviance and Intergroup Comparison, 
participants answered a series of 6 questions measuring their emotional reaction to the 
alleged results: -4 = Very satisfied, Very good mood, Not at all worried, Not at all anxious; 
+4 = Very unsatisfied, Very bad mood, Very worried, Very anxious. We computed a 
measure of Emotional Reaction to Deviance and Intergroup Comparison corresponding to 
the mean of 4 of these measures, α = .78.6 In this new measure, the more negative the 
value, the more negative the emotional reaction.  
Attribution of competence and morality characteristics to the target. 
Participants had to rate a series of 24 characteristics on a 9-point scale, regarding the extent 
to which they define the target: the scale ranged from “does not characterize at all” on one 
end, to “neither characterizes nor does not characterize” in the middle, to “characterizes a 
lot” on the other end.  
 These items were obtained in a previous study which determined the characteristics 
that Portuguese people use to define a person that is “Moral”, “Immoral”, “Competent” or 
“Incompetent” (Barbosa, 2012). We created a measure of Morality, α= .86, corresponding 
to the mean of the following 6 items: (1) Tem respeito pelos outros, (2) Segue as normas 
da sociedade, (3) É honesta, (4) Tem princípios, (5) Tem ética, (6) É íntegra/digna. The 
measure of Immorality, α= .89, corresponds to the mean of the following 6 items: (1) Não 
tem princípios, (2) É má pessoa, (3) Não respeita os outros, (4) Não segue as normas da 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The same 3 items were included pertaining to Italians. The purpose of this was to avoid suspicion about the 
mention of Spanish people.	  
6 Mean r = .46; The items “surprised” and “disappointed” were eliminated due to their low correlations to the 
remaining 4 items: Item-total correlation, r = .15; R2 = .11; and Item-total correlation, r = .29; R2 = .18, 
respectively. 
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sociedade, (5) É desonesta, (6) Não tem ética. The measure of Competence, α = .85, 
corresponds to the mean of the following items: (1) É pontual, (2) É organizada, (3) 
Executa tarefas devidamente, (4) Sabe trabalhar em equipa, (5) Cumpre tarefas, (6) É 
responsável, (7) É eficiente. Finally the measure of Incompetence, less reliable then the 
others, α= .65, had a mean of the following 3 items: (1) É irresponsável, (2) É ineficaz, (3) 
Não cumpre objetivos.7 
General evaluation of the target’s morality, competence and overall 
impression. Participants rated the target on two general measures of Morality and 
Competence on a 9-point scale. The measure of Morality ranged from “extremely 
immoral” (= -4) to “extremely moral” (= +4). The measure of Competence ranged from 
“extremely incompetent” (= -4) to “extremely competent” (= +4). 
Finally, participants answered a question in which they stated their Overall 
Impression of the target on a scale ranging from “extremely negative (= -4)” to “extremely 
positive (= +4)”. 
 
Results 
To test our set of predictions, we used contrast analyses rather than omnibus 
ANOVAs. This is because we had highly focused predictions, which in most cases meant 
the comparison of one experimental condition with all other conditions. Following 
Rosenthal, Rosnow and Rubin (2000), we utilized this statistical procedure due to its 
greater statistical power compared to omnibus procedures. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The mean correlations of each measure are the following: r = .51, r = .57, r = .46 and r = .27.	  
	  
	  
35	  
Value Ascribed to Personal and Social Levels of Self-Categorization 
Although these dependent measures were collected prior to any manipulation, we 
checked for their equivalence across conditions. The repeated measures ANOVA of Value 
Ascribed to Personal vs. Social Self-Categorization, revealed no significant effects, highest 
F (7, 84) = 1.47, ns.  
The contrast with the mid-point of the scale shows that participants positively value 
both levels of identity: Personal Identity, M = 1.27, SD = 1.07, t (91) = 11.46, p < .001; 
Social Identity, M  = 1.08, SD = 1.15, t (91) = 9.05, p < .001.  
Portuguese Identity 
The ANOVA analysis shows that Portuguese Identity is also equivalent across 
conditions, F (7, 84) = 1.82, ns. The overall mean shows that participants identify 
positively with being Portuguese, M  = 1.53, SD = 1.16, t (91) = 12.67, p < .001.  
Differentiation from Spanish 
The results from the ANOVAs regarding the three measures focused on 
Differentiation from Spanish were consistent with those of Portuguese Identity. Firstly, 
participants consider that the Portuguese are neither similar or different from the Spanish, 
M  = -0.11, SD = 1.93, t (91) < 1 (this is equivalent across conditions, F7, 84 < 1).8  
Secondly, participants strongly disagree that the Spanish have more reasons to be “proud 
of their traditions and history”, M  = - 1.74, SD = 1.63, t (91) = 10.24, p < .001  (this is 
equivalent across conditions, F7, 84 < 1).9 And, finally, participants even more strongly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 A different pattern emerged in the case of Italians: although close to “0”, M  = -0.42, SD = 1.33, t (91) = 
2.22, p = .029, participants slightly disagreed that Portuguese are similar to Italians (this is equivalent 
across conditions, F7, 84 < 1). 
9 The same pattern emerges in the case of Italians: M  = - 1.58, SD = 1.85, t (91) = 8.18, p < .001, (this is 
equivalent across conditions, F7, 84 < 1).	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disagree that they would “prefer being Spanish to being Portuguese”, M  = - 2.49, SD = 
1.69, t (91) = 14.10, p < .001  (this is equivalent across conditions, F7, 84 < 1).10  
Emotional Reaction to Type of Deviance and Intergroup Comparison 
 Our first prediction tests the effect of intergroup setting created by our experimental 
design on participants’ emotional reaction. As described earlier, our tenet was that the 
condition that would elicit a stronger negative emotional reaction is that in which they are 
faced with a potentially unfavorable intergroup comparison and with an immoral deviant. 
The pattern of the means in the four conditions is as follows:  Immoral Deviant/Secure 
Intergroup Comparison, M = 0.36, SD = 1.51; Immoral Deviant/Insecure Intergroup 
Comparison, M = 0.30, SD = 1.29; Incompetent Deviant/Secure Intergroup Comparison, M 
= 0.63, SD = 1.33; Incompetent Deviant/Insecure Intergroup Comparison, M = 0.37, SD = 
1.05. To test this prediction we performed a contrast analysis using the following contrast 
values: -3 on the Immoral Deviant/Insecure Intergroup Comparison condition, and +1 on 
the remaining three conditions. Our prediction was not confirmed: t (88) < 1. Actually, 
participants’ emotional reaction, although mild, is significantly positive as revealed by the 
comparison of the overall mean with the scale mid-point (0), M = 0.42, SD = 1.29, t (91) = 
3.09, p = .003. 
Attribution of Competence and Morality Characteristics to the Target 
 Participants had to attribute positive and negative characteristics to the target 
concerning his morality and competence, or in the latter case, his immorality and 
incompetence. These characteristics were attributed on dimensions that were both 
“consistent” and “inconsistent” with the target’s behavior. For instance, participants judged 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  The same pattern emerges in the case of Italians: M  = - 2.23, SD = 1.77, t (91) = 12.05, p < .001, (this is 
equivalent across conditions, F7, 84 = 1.56, ns).	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an Immoral target in terms of his morality and immorality, but also in terms of his 
competence and incompetence. While the first two aspects are both consistent with the 
dimension of the target’s behavior, the latter two are inconsistent. Conversely, Incompetent 
targets were judged on their competence and incompetence, as well as morality and 
immorality. 
 As previously stated, we predicted an effect of primacy of morality in the 
dimension consistent with the target’s behavior: that is, participants should attribute less 
positive and more negative characteristics (in the morality dimension) to the Immoral 
target, than to the Incompetent on the competence dimension; but even more so in the case 
of the Ingroup targets. To test these predictions, we ran two contrast analyses, with one on 
the attribution of positive aspects and the other regarding negative aspects.  In Table 2, we 
present the pattern of attributions of morality and immorality to the Immoral target and 
competence and incompetence to the Incompetent target – the “consistent” dimensions. 
In the first analysis, regarding the attribution of Positive characteristics (either 
morality or competence, according to conditions), we entered the following contrast 
values: Ingroup / Immoral / Secure = -1; Ingroup / Immoral / Insecure = -1; Ingroup / 
Incompetent / Secure = 1; Ingroup / Incompetent / Insecure = 1; Outgroup / Immoral / 
Secure = -1; Outgroup / Immoral / Insecure = -1; Outgroup / Incompetent / Secure = 1; 
Outgroup / Incompetent / Insecure = 1. Results were consistent with our first prediction, t 
(84) = -2.90, p = .005. As expected, participants attributed less morality to the Immoral 
targets (respectively -2.34, -2.49, -1.54, -2.37) than competence to the Incompetent targets 
(respectively -1.32, -1.64, -1.18, -1.39).11 Additionally, we expected that these attributions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 In an omnibus ANOVA, this corresponds to the main effect of Type of Deviance, F (1, 84) = 8.41, p = .005 
(highest remaining effect, F = 1.87, ns) 
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of positive characteristics were stronger for Ingroup targets. However, results of this 
contrast analysis was not consistent with our prediction, t (84) = 1.18, ns.12 
 
Table 2. Attribution of Characteristics on the Dimension Consistent with the Target’s 
Behavior  
 Ingroup Target Outgroup Target 
 Immoral Incompetent Immoral Incompetent 
Dimension Secure Insecure Secure Insecure Secure Insecure Secure Insecure 
Positive 
(Morality or 
Competence) 
-2.34 
(1.28) 
-2.49 
(1.03) 
-1.32 
(1.60) 
-1.64 
(1.41) 
-1.54 
(1.24) 
-2.37 
(1.12) 
-1.18 
(1.37) 
-1.39 
(1.48) 
Negative 
(Immorality or 
Incompetence) 
2.02 
(0.95) 
2.08 
(1.09) 
0.04 
(1.89) 
0.92 
(1.06) 
1.15 
(0.86) 
1.71 
(0.88) 
0.33 
(1.65) 
0.54 
(1.25) 
 
Regarding the attribution of negative characteristics, we ran the equivalent contrast 
analyses, but with reversed values for each condition: this means, +1, +1, -1, -1, +1, +1, -1, 
-1, for the test of the effect of primacy of morality. Results were consistent with our 
prediction: participants attributed more immorality to the Immoral targets (2.02, 2.08, 1.15, 
1.71) than incompetence to the Incompetent targets (0.04, 0.92, 0.33, 0.54), t (84) = 4.92, p 
< .001. Additionally, in the attribution of such characteristics to Ingroup or Outgroup 
targets, we found a result consist with our prediction, but only marginally significant, t (84) 
= 1.67, p = .098 (contrast values, +1, +1, 0, 0, -1, -1, 0, 0). This result shows that, as we 
predicted, participants’ attributions of negative characteristics were stronger for Ingroup 
targets (2.02, 2.08) than for Outgroup targets (1.15, 1.71).13 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 In this analysis, the contrast values were as follows: -1, -1, 0, 0, +1, +1, 0, 0, in the same order. 
13 In an omnibus ANOVA, the only significant effect was the corresponding main effect of Type of Deviance, 
F (1, 84) = 24.20, p < .001 (highest remaining effect, F1, 84 = 2.71, ns). 
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 Our prediction in the case of the attribution of characteristics on the alternate 
dimension was that we would find a pattern consistent with a halo effect for the Immoral 
Ingroup Member in the Insecure Intergroup Comparison context. To test this hypothesis, 
we ran a contrast analysis, entering the value +7 got the Ingroup / Immoral / Insecure 
condition, and -1 to all other conditions, with regards to the attribution of negative 
dimensions (that is, attributions of immorality and incompetence). The positivity/negativity 
of contrast values were reversed for the attribution of positive dimensions (that is, morality 
and competence). The means corresponding to these analyses are presented in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Attribution of Characteristics on the Dimension Alternate from the Target’s 
Behavior  
 Ingroup Target Outgroup Target 
 Immoral Incompetent Immoral Incompetent 
Dimension Secure Insecure Secure Insecure Secure Insecure Secure Insecure 
Positive 
(Morality or 
Competence) 
-0.74 
(1.05) 
-1.01 
(1.32) 
-0.63 
(1.24) 
-0.94 
(1.02) 
-0.17 
(1.01) 
-1.17 
(1.28) 
-0.04 
(0.86) 
-1.24 
(1.08) 
Negative 
(Immorality or 
Incompetence) 
0.38 
(0.61) 
0.94 
(1.31) 
-0.12 
(1.55) 
0.38 
(0.78) 
0.24 
(0.82) 
0.47 
(0.81) 
-0.50 
(1.07) 
0.30 
(1.02) 
 
Results from the first contrast analysis were consistent with our prediction: 
participants attributed more incompetence to the Immoral Ingroup Member in the Insecure 
Comparison (0.94) than in all other conditions, t (84) = 2.35, p = .021. Additionally, this is 
the only mean that is significantly different from 0, t (10) = 2.38, p = .039 (highest 
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remaining difference, t11 = 2.14, ns). This means that participants do in fact judge the 
Immoral target as being incompetent.14 
For the attribution of positive dimensions, the contrast analysis results were not 
consistent with our prediction (see the means in the upper part of Table 3, contrast of -1.01 
with all others), t (84) < 1.15  
General Evaluation of the Target’s Morality, Competence and Overall Impression  
In the case of the General Evaluation of the Target’s Morality and Competence, we 
predicted that we would again find an effect of morality primacy in the dimensions 
consistent with the target’s deviance, which would also be stronger for ingroup targets. To 
examine this hypothesis, we ran a contrast analysis with the value -1 in the Immoral 
conditions, and +1 in the Incompetent conditions. Results were partially consistent with our 
prediction of a primacy of morality effect, t (84) = -1.85, p = .068. As shown in Table 4, 
although only marginally significant, as predicted, participants evaluate the Immoral 
targets (either Ingroup or Outgroup members) as less moral (-1.67, -1.82, -2.09, -1.67) than 
the Incompetent as competent (-1.27, -1.08, -1.33, -1.73). Our additional prediction that 
this effect would be even stronger in the Ingroup was not supported by the corresponding 
contrast analysis, t (84) < 1 (contrast values, +1, +1, 0, 0, -1, -1, 0, 0).16 
We also hypothesized, as above, that in the alternate dimension we would find a 
pattern consistent with a halo effect for the Immoral Ingroup Member in the Insecure 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Nonetheless, we checked for the difference between this condition and the corresponding Outgroup 
condition (0.47), using a contrast analysis attributing the values +1 and -1, respectively, and 0 for the 
remaining. The difference was not significant, t (84) = 1.09, ns. 
15 The contrasts are the same as with the negative characteristics, but with the opposite sign: -7 for the 
Ingroup / Immoral / Insecure, and +1 for all others. We again ran an omnibus ANOVA and as the pattern of 
contrasts in Table 3 shows, we found only an effect of Intergroup Comparison, F (1, 84) = 8.95, p = .004 
(remaining F < 3.01, ns). This result indicates that participants attribute less positive dimensions (both 
Morality and Competence) to the target in the Insecure condition, M = -1.09, SD = 1.15, than in the Secure 
condition, M = -0.39, SD = 1.05. 
16 We ran an omnibus ANOVA and found only the same partial main effect of Type of Deviance, F (1, 84) = 
3.41, p = .068. 
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Intergroup Comparison context. To test this prediction, we performed a contrast analysis, 
giving the value  +7 to the Ingroup / Immoral / Insecure condition, and -1 to all other 
conditions. The results were consistent with our hypothesis, as participants had a stronger 
negative judgment of the target in the Immoral Ingroup Member in the Insecure Context (-
1.27) than in all other conditions, t (84) = -2.01, p = .048. Further, this mean is the only 
that is significantly different from 0, t (10) = 2.71, p = .022 (highest remaining difference, 
t11 = -2.17, ns): participants again judge the Immoral target as incompetent.17 
 
Table 4. Evaluation of Target’s Morality, Competence and Overall Impression  
 Ingroup Target Outgroup Target 
 Immoral Incompetent Immoral Incompetent 
 Secure Insecure Secure Insecure Secure Insecure Secure Insecure 
Consistent 
Dimension 
-1.67 
(1.15) 
-1.82 
(1.40) 
-1.27 
(1.42) 
-1.08 
(1.00) 
-2.09 
(0.94) 
-1.67 
(1.07) 
-1.33 
(0.98) 
-1.73 
(1.42) 
Alternate 
Dimension 
-0.58 
(1.38) 
-1.27 
(1.56) 
-0.73 
(1.19) 
-0.50 
(0.80) 
0.00 
(1.18) 
-0.42 
(1.62) 
-0.33 
(0.65) 
-0.73 
(1.27) 
Overall 
Impression 
-1.75 
(1.29) 
-2.55 
(1.04) 
-1.27 
(1.27) 
-1.17 
(1.11) 
-1.55 
(1.21) 
-1.83 
(1.03) 
-1.17 
(0.83) 
-1.27 
(1.27) 
 
When it came to Overall Impression, we predicted a general evaluation that would 
be consistent with all previous results, that is, participants should evaluate the Immoral 
Ingroup Member in the Insecure Intergroup Comparison condition more negatively than in 
all other conditions. To test this final hypothesis, we performed a contrast analysis, 
entering the value  -7 to the Ingroup / Immoral / Insecure condition, and +1 to all other 
conditions. Results were consistent with our hypothesis, as the general impression that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Regardless, we used a contrast analysis to check the difference between this condition and condition with 
the closest mean (0.73), entering the values +1 and -1, respectively, and 0 for the remaining. The difference 
was not significant, t (84) = -1.19, ns. 
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participants had of the target was more negative for the Immoral Ingroup Member in the 
Insecure Comparison  (-2.55) than in all other conditions, t (84) = 3.05, p = .003.18  
Discussion 
In general, the results of this study confirm our predictions and are consistent with 
previous research on group membership, deviant behavior and threat to social identity. 
Within the framework of a 2 (Group Membership: Ingroup vs. Outgroup) x 2 (Type of 
Deviance: Immoral vs. Incompetent) x 2 (Intergroup Comparison: Secure vs. Insecure) 
study, we found support for our key predictions regarding the primacy of morality in the 
Immoral condition and a halo effect for the Immoral Ingroup Member in an Insecure 
Intergroup Comparison. 
First, we will discuss the results related to the initial dependent measure that 
followed experimental manipulation, which was the Emotional Reaction to Type of 
Deviance and Intergroup Comparison. We predicted that when participants are presented 
with a target that is immorally deviant and in a potentially unfavorable intergroup 
comparison, they would have a stronger negative emotional reaction than in all other 
conditions. This prediction was not confirmed by our results. This could possibly be 
explained by a lack of strength in the manipulation. Since the measurement was taken after 
the manipulation of both Deviance and Intergroup Comparison, it is possible that the 
combined manipulations actually moderated participants’ emotional reactions. If only one 
variable had been manipulated, and then emotional reaction were measured, perhaps the 
reaction would have been stronger or more fitting with our prediction, as it would be more 
focused. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 To compare the difference between this condition and the two conditions with comparable higher means (–
1.83 and -1.75), we ran a contrast analysis with the values -2 for the Ingroup / Immoral / Insecure 
condition, 1 for the two in question, and 0 for the remaining. The difference was not significant, t (84) < 1. 
The omnibus ANOVA revealed only a main effect of Type of Deviance, F (1, 84) = 8.64, p = .004 (highest 
remaining effect, F = 1.30, ns). 
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Regarding our primary hypotheses, the results from the dependent measures of 
Attribution of Competence and Morality Characteristics to the Target and General 
Evaluation of the Target’s Morality, Competence and Overall Impression must be 
consulted. The results pertaining to both dependent measures support our hypothesis that 
there would be an effect of primacy of morality in the Immoral condition. Participants 
considered that the Immoral target was more immoral than the Incompetent target was 
incompetent. These results are consistent with previous studies that have shown the 
importance of morality in evaluations of others (Wojciszke, Bazinska, & Jaworski, 1998; 
De Bruin, & Van Lange, 1999; Martijn, et al., 1992; Vonk, 1996). 
However, the prediction that this effect of primacy of morality would be stronger in 
the Ingroup condition was not fully supported. Although partial support was found in the 
case of attribution of negative characteristics (that is, those corresponding with 
immorality), results were not supportive in the case of attribution of positive characteristics 
(morality) or in the general evaluation of the target’s morality. These results can be 
explained by previous research on differing emotional reactions as a result of the valence 
of morality (Wojciszke & Szymków, 2003), which has shown that immoral behavior is 
perceived as inherently negative, while moral behavior is perceived more ambiguously. 
This means that immorality is more salient when considering a deviant’s behavior, as it is 
more easily associated with the actions. Therefore, when individuals make judgments on a 
target’s morality, it is easier to attribute negative characteristics (those related to immoral 
behavior), since they are not only more clearly defined, but they correspond with the 
deviant behavior. 
Concerning our other central hypothesis that attribution of characteristics on the 
alternate dimension would result in a pattern consistent with a halo effect for Immoral 
Ingroup Members in the Insecure Intergroup Comparison, the results were generally 
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supportive. Significant results were encountered in the attribution of negative 
characteristics and in the general evaluation of target’s morality and competence, but not in 
the case of attribution of positive characteristics. This means that when attributing negative 
characteristics and making an overall evaluation, participants judge the Immoral target as 
also being incompetent, but only when the intergroup comparison is insecure. These results 
corroborate previous research related to a halo effect of morality (Rosenberg, Nelson & 
Vivekananthan, 1968; Asch, 1946; Judd et al., 2005; Peeters, 1992) and deviance 
provoking intergroup differentiation (Marques et al., 2001; Marques, Páez & Abrams, 
1998). 
Our final hypothesis, pertaining to the overall impression of the target, was that 
participants would have a stronger negative evaluation of the Immoral Ingroup Member in 
the Insecure Intergroup Comparison than of the targets in all other conditions. The results 
of our study supported this hypothesis because participants’ overall impression of the 
Immoral Ingroup Member in the Insecure Comparison context was more negative than 
their impression of targets in the other conditions. Our results confirm previous research on 
the importance of morality in general evaluations (De Bruin, & Van Lange, 1999; Martijn, 
et al., 1992; Vonk, 1996; Wojciszke, Bazinska, & Jaworski, 1998) and the impact of 
deviance on impressions of ingroup members (Marques et al., 1988; Marques et al., 2001; 
Marques, Páez & Abrams, 1998). 
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Conclusion 
The purpose of this study was to provide further knowledge to the field of social 
psychology and verify previous research, particularly pertaining to the ideas of group 
membership, deviant behavior and threat to social identity. By focusing our investigation 
on immoral and incompetent behavior, ingroup and outgroup membership and secure and 
insecure intergroup comparison contexts, we were able to show the significant impact of a 
morally deviant ingroup member and an insecure intergroup comparison on the emotional 
reactions, perceptions and evaluations from other ingroup individuals. These results are 
important for the progress of research in these specific areas and also in other related 
subjects in social psychology, such as group behavior, stereotyping, intergroup conflict, 
leadership, conformity, and behavior motivation.  
 Although we encountered significant results for the majority of our hypotheses, 
there are some aspects of this study that could be improved upon in further research for 
more consistency and substantial significance in results. First, we suggest an increase in the 
number of participants, as this was a slight limitation in the current study. For example, the 
amount of participants did not allow us to check the correlations between the value people 
ascribe to Social Identity / Personal Identity and Portuguese Identity across conditions. 
Additionally, we believe that a larger sample size would lead to stronger results throughout 
the study, especially concerning possible interactions in the data, as we observed that there 
were many results that were marginally significant or showed the possibility for 
significance.  
 Another alteration that we would advise is the use of stronger manipulations of 
intergroup comparison. As the measurement of Emotional Reaction came after two 
different manipulations (Type of Deviance and Intergroup Comparison), we actually could 
not surmise which variable was having an effect on participants’ emotional reactions. In 
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future research, we propose that measurements be taken after the manipulation of each 
variable. Alternatively, the elimination of one level of analysis could also facilitate the 
possibility of encountering greater significance in results. Since this study was made up of 
a 2 X 2 X 2 factorial design, it is possible that the use of three separate manipulations was 
too much, leading to less focus on either manipulation, and therefore, minimal reaction. 
 Further advice includes extreme caution with the scale of Attribution of 
Competence and Morality Characteristics to the Target and exclusion of the measurement 
of negative traits on a scale from “does not characterize at all” to “characterizes a lot” as 
this can lead to confusion for the participants. Instead, the scale should be modified so that 
it is easier to make attributions on negative traits.  
Also, we suggest the use of either only one experimenter or, if necessary, several 
experimenters who have all been extensively trained to exhibit the same behavior while 
conducting the experiment. For the case of this study, it was not possible for the main 
experimenter to take part in the distribution of questionnaires, as her obvious feature of 
being foreign, and therefore automatically considered the member of an outgroup, could 
have led to unwanted effects in the investigation. Therefore, if other experimenters are 
utilized, is it essential that their differences in mannerisms are accounted for and 
minimized, in order to avoid experimenter effects. Finally, care in the choice of 
participants should be taken, and if students are utilized, it is important to survey different 
types of students from different courses, so as to diversify the sample. 
 If all of the proposed suggestions are considered and accounted for in further 
studies, we are certain that the extent of the significance of this study will only improve. 
We look forward to seeing how the current research impacts the academic and research 
community, as well as possible further research that may develop following the 
establishment of the results of this investigation. 
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O	  presente	  inquérito	  faz	  parte	  de	  uma	  investigação	  internacional.	  Este	  estudo	  
faz	  parte	  de	  uma	  investigação	  mais	  abrangente	  que	  envolve	  outras	  universidades.	  	  
A	   participação	   é	   anónima	   e	   os	   dados	   confidenciais,	   sendo	   acedidos	   apenas	  
pela	  equipa	  de	  investigação.	  Neste	  inquérito	  não	  há	  respostas	  certas	  ou	  erradas,	  o	  
importante	  é	  a	  sua	  opinião	  pessoal.	  	  
A	  resposta	  deve	  ocupar-­‐lhe	  cerca	  de	  5-­‐10	  minutos	  do	  seu	  tempo.	  Poderá	  ter	  
acesso	  aos	  resultados	  do	  estudo	  através	  dos	  contactos	  no	  rodapé.	  
A	  sua	  participação	  é	  essencial	  para	  a	  concretização	  do	  estudo.	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Pedimos-­‐lhe	  que	  indique	  o	  seu	  grau	  de	  acordo	  com	  cada	  uma	  das	  afirmações	  que	  
se	   seguem.	   A	   escala	   de	   resposta	   tem	  9	   pontos	   e	   varia	   entre	   “Discordo	   totalmente”	   e	  
“Concordo	  totalmente”.	  Ou	  seja,	  quanto	  mais	  concordar	  com	  a	  afirmação,	  mais	  à	  direita	  
deve	  colocar	  a	  sua	  resposta;	  quanto	  mais	  discordar,	  mais	  à	  esquerda	  a	  deve	  colocar.	  
	  
	  
Discordo	  
totalmente	   	  
Nem	  discordo,	  
nem	  concordo	   	  
Concordo	  
totalmente	  
As	   pessoas	   que	   dependem	   apenas	   de	   si	  
próprias	  progridem	  mais	  facilmente	  na	  vida.	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  
Os	   grupos	   sociais	   a	   que	   eu	   pertenço	  
contribuem	  para	  definir	  a	  pessoa	  que	  eu	  sou.	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  
Aquilo	  que	  nos	  define	   como	  pessoas	  deve	   ser	  
encontrado	  dentro	  de	  nós.	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  
Habitualmente,	  aquilo	  que	  acontece	  com	  um	  grupo	  
a	  que	  pertenço	  tem	  influência	  na	  minha	  vida.	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  
O	   que	   partilhamos	   com	   as	   pessoas	   dos	   grupos	   a	  
que	  pertencemos	  é	  a	  essência	  daquilo	  que	  somos.	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  
Tenho	   fortes	   laços	   com	   os	   grupos	   sociais	   a	   que	  
pertenço.	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Ao	   definirmo-­‐nos	   como	   pessoas	   devemos	  
procurar	  ser	  “únicos”.	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  
Definimo-­‐nos	  como	  pessoas	  pelos	  padrões	  dos	  
grupos	  a	  que	  pertencemos.	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  
Depender	   apenas	   de	   mim	   é	   importante	   para	  
ter	  mais	  controlo	  sobre	  o	  que	  me	  acontece.	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  
A	  “essência”	  de	  cada	  pessoa	  está	  dentro	  de	  si.	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Os	   grupos	   sociais	   de	   que	   faço	   parte	   têm	  
reflexo	  naquilo	  que	  eu	  sou.	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  
Definimo-­‐nos	   como	   pessoas	   pelos	   grupos	   a	  
que	  pertencemos.	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  
Encontramos	  nos	  grupos	  de	  que	  fazemos	  parte	  
aquilo	  que	  nos	  define	  como	  pessoas.	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  
Para	  ter	  uma	  opinião	  pessoal	  sobre	  as	  coisas	  que	  me	  
importam,	  mais	  vale	  pensar	  por	  mim	  mesmo(a).	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  
Definimo-­‐nos	   como	   pessoas	   ao	   sermos	   “nós	  
próprios”.	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  
Para	   definir	   quem	   somos	   temos	   de	   ser	  
independentes	  dos	  outros.	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Neste	   estudo	   participam	   pessoas	   de	   vários	   países,	   nomeadamente	   portugueses,	  
espanhóis	   e	   italianos.	   A	   todos	   estas	   pessoas	   colocámos	   questões	   semelhantes	   às	   que	  
encontra	  a	  seguir.	  
Indique	  o	  seu	  grau	  de	  acordo	  com	  cada	  uma	  das	  afirmações	  seguintes.	  
	  
	  
	  
Discordo	  
totalmente	   	  
Nem	  discordo,	  
nem	  concordo	   	  
Concordo	  
totalmente	  
Para	  mim	  é	  muito	  importante	  ser	  português.	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Tenho	  orgulho	  em	  dizer	  que	  sou	  português.	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Tenho	  uma	  ligação	  forte	  com	  o	  meu	  país.	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Prefiro	   ser	   português	   do	   que	   ser	   de	   outra	  
nacionalidade	  qualquer.	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  
É	  importante	  para	  mim	  sentir-­‐me	  português.	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Tenho	   orgulho	   das	   tradições	   e	   da	   história	   de	  
Portugal.	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Os	   portugueses	   e	   espanhóis	   são	   semelhantes	  
em	  muitos	  aspetos.	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  
Em	   geral,	   os	   espanhóis	   têm	  mais	   razões	   para	  
ter	  orgulho	  nas	  suas	  tradições	  e	  história.	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  
Preferia	  ser	  espanhol	  do	  que	  português.	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Os	  portugueses	  e	  italianos	  são	  semelhantes	  em	  
muitos	  aspetos.	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  
Em	  geral,	  os	  italianos	  têm	  mais	  razões	  para	  ter	  
orgulho	  nas	  suas	  tradições	  e	  história.	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  
Preferia	  ser	  italiano	  do	  que	  português.	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Nesta	   investigação	   internacional,	   as	   equipas	  dos	  países	  envolvidos	   têm	  analisado	  
as	   reações	   das	   pessoas	   a	   diferentes	   tipos	   de	   comportamentos,	   e	   também	   as	  
consequências	  de	  tais	  reações	  nas	  pessoas	  envolvidas.	  Uma	  das	  tarefas	  que	  é	  proposta	  
aos	  participantes	  dos	  vários	  países,	  é	  que	  discutam	  e	  façam	  uma	  avaliação	  de	  diferentes	  
situações	  e	  das	  pessoas	  nelas	  envolvidas.	  Apresentamos	  abaixo	  uma	  das	  situações	  que	  
foi	  discutida	  e	  avaliada	  no	  primeiro	  estudo.	  
TASK. 4 – Target C 
 
“Num	   jantar	   de	   antigos	   colegas	   de	   escola	   que	   não	   se	   encontravam	   há	   vários	   anos,	   as	  
pessoas	   foram	  conversando	  umas	  com	  as	  outras	  sobre	  as	  suas	  vidas	  privadas.	  Puderam	  
constatar	  que,	  na	  generalidade,	  são	  pessoas	  felizes	  e	  realizadas.	  No	  entanto,	  através	  de	  
algumas	   conversas,	   acabam	   por	   descobrir	   que	   uma	   dessas	   pessoas	   colocou	   numa	  
situação	   difícil	   uma	   das	   empresas	   em	   que	   trabalhou	   como	   gestor,	   por	   ter	   desviado	  
ilicitamente	   quantias	   de	   dinheiro	   importantes.”	   […por	   não	   fazer	   cumprir	   os	   prazos	   de	  
produção	  contratados]	  
 
 
	  
	  
	  
Como	  pode	  verificar	  no	  gráfico	  abaixo,	  tanto	  os	  participantes	  portugueses	  como	  os	  
espanhóis	   avaliaram	   negativamente	   a	   pessoa	   envolvida	   nesta	   situação.	   Contudo,	  
verifica-­‐se	   também	   que,	   estatisticamente,	   os	   portugueses	   fazem	   uma	   avaliação	  
claramente	   mais	   negativa.	   […não	   é	   claro	   nestes	   resultados	   qual	   dos	   dois	   grupos	   de	  
participantes	  faz	  uma	  avaliação	  mais	  negativa]	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
[ns	  (não	  sig.)]	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Em	  relação	  aos	  resultados	  que	  lhe	  acabamos	  de	  apresentar	  você	  ficou:	  
	  
Nada	  surpreendido(a)	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Muito	  surpreendido(a)	  
Nada	  desiludido(a)	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Muito	  desiludido(a)	  
Muito	  satisfeito(a)	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Muito	  insatisfeito(a)	  
Muito	  bem	  disposto(a)	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Muito	  mal	  disposto(a)	  
Nada	  preocupado(a)	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Muito	  preocupado(a)	  
Nada	  ansioso(a)	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Muito	  ansioso(a)	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De	  facto,	  a	  situação	  que	  lhe	  apresentámos	  antes	  foi	  adaptada	  de	  uma	  situação	  real	  
que	   foi	   publicada	   num	   artigo	   recente	   do	   jornal	   diário	   Jornal	   de	   Notícias.	   […do	   jornal	  
diário	  El	  País]	  
Queremos	   agora	   que	   nos	   dê	   também	   a	   sua	   opinião	   acerca	   desta	   pessoa	  
portuguesa.	   Para	   tal,	   apresentamos-­‐lhe	   abaixo	   um	   conjunto	   de	   características	   que	  
também	  foram	  utilizadas	  nos	  estudos	  anteriores.	  
Por	   favor,	   indique	  em	  que	  medida	   acha	  que	   cada	  uma	  das	   características	   abaixo	  
poderá	  caracterizar	  a	  pessoa	  envolvida	  naquela	  situação	  relatada	  no	  Jornal	  de	  Notícias.	  
[…no	  El	  País]	  
	  
	  
Não	  caracteriza	  
nada	  
Caracteriza	  
pouco	  
Caracteriza	  	  	  	  
nem	  muito,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
nem	  pouco	   Caracteriza	  
Caracteriza	  
muito	  
Tem	  respeito	  pelos	  outros	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Não	  tem	  princípios	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
É	  pontual	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
É	  má	  pessoa	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
É	  organizada	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Executa	  tarefas	  devidamente	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Segue	  as	  normas	  da	  sociedade	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
É	  preguiçosa	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Sabe	  trabalhar	  em	  equipa	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Não	  respeita	  os	  outros	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
É	  irresponsável	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
É	  honesta	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
É	  ineficaz	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Não	  caracteriza	  
nada	  
Caracteriza	  
pouco	  
Caracteriza	  	  	  	  
nem	  muito,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
nem	  pouco	   Caracteriza	  
Caracteriza	  
muito	  
Tem	  princípios	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Cumpre	  tarefas	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Não	  segue	  as	  normas	  da	  sociedade	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Tem	  ética	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
É	  responsável	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
É	  íntegra/digna	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Não	  se	  esforça	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
É	  desonesta	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Não	  tem	  ética	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Não	  cumpre	  objetivos	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
É	  eficiente	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  
Na	  sua	  opinião,	  em	  geral,	  a	  pessoa	  envolvida	  na	  situação	  relatada	  no	  artigo	  do	  Jornal	  de	  
Notícias	  é:	  […do	  jornal	  El	  País	  é:]	  
Extremamente	  	  	  
imoral	   	   Imoral	   	  
Nem	  moral,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
nem	  imoral	   	   Moral	   	  
Extremamente	  
moral	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Extremamente	  	  	  
incompetente	   	   Incompetente	  
Nem	  competente,	  	  
nem	  incompetente	   Competente	   	  
Extremamente	  
competente	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  
Em	  termos	  gerais,	  com	  que	  impressão	  fica	  acerca	  da	  pessoa	  envolvida	  naquela	  situação?	  
Extremamente	  	  	  
negativa	   	   Negativa	   	  
Nem	  negativa,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
nem	  positiva	   	   Positiva	   	  
Extremamente	  
positiva	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  
Sexo:	  	   Masculino	  	   	   Feminino	  	   	   Idade:	  ________	  
Obrigado	  pela	  sua	  participação.	  
